Opinions from This Combat Veteran of the Vietnam War

          Since the day the Unites States declared war on the terrorists who seized airliners filled with innocents and flew them into American buildings, I have supported our leaders and our troops in every way I can.  In the early campaigns, it seemed that the vast majority of Americans also supported the troops; but as time passed and our presence in the Middle East was prolonged by insurgencies I have watched as staunch support dwindled toward apathy and the ugly face of politics entered the fray.  In recent years, political opposition from even those who voted in Congress to go to war arose to the point that some, who opposed President Bush politically, prematurely declared defeat in Iraq.  As a combat veteran and writer of military history, my worst nightmares are coming true.  History is repeating itself; the real nightmare of the Vietnam War – perhaps well-intentioned but definitely wrong-headed political micromanagement of our military – is recurring.

          At the epicenter of this controversy are the military’s Rules of Engagement, which are assigned to them for every mission by our political and senior military leadership.  When they are assigned a combat mission, our military leaders use a very thorough and battle-tested formula to ensure that they have covered all the bases:  Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration, and Command, Control and Communications (SMEAC).  Unit leaders, when planning combat operations, must first thoroughly understand the situation they are in, through observation and intelligence gathering.  The mission statement must be clear and concise, and the mission must be achievable.  They must develop a sound strategy and plan the tactics they will use, and then execute the plan affectively and aggressively.  They must ensure that the troops have all the “beans, Band-aids and bullets” they need to accomplish the mission and that their logistical plan is sound.  Finally, they must ensure that the troops have the communications tools they need to coordinate their efforts.  Underlying all of these important elements of a combat mission are the Rules of Engagement (ROE).  ROE can either support their efforts to accomplish their mission with a minimum of friendly and civilian casualties, or they can, and often do, hamper their effectiveness resulting in greater losses.

          In military operations, the Rules of Engagement determine when, where, and how force shall be used.  ROE are used in the American military to ensure that our troops fight humanely.  Rules of Engagement are theoretically put in place to avoid “collateral damage,” that terribly inadequate term used to politely describe the destruction of people’s homes and the violent deaths of innocents.  In my experience, however, the Rules of Engagement forced upon me and my fellow Marines and soldiers during the Vietnam War did little to avoid these horrible consequences of war.  Ultimately in war, innocents die and homes and churches and businesses are destroyed.  In Vietnam, the ROE did more to kill American soldiers and Marines, did more to destroy our faith and trust in our political and military leaders, than they did to save innocent lives.

           I do understand the political need and humane desire, especially on the part of Americans, to keep civilian casualties at a minimum; but I am not so sure that the President, or any of my fellow Americans who have no personal experience in combat, understand the risk and danger in implementing policies that unnecessarily restrain our use of military power.  Americans have a compulsion to “fight fair.”  We are taught, from a young age, that we must not take advantage of the weak.  Those lessons of our youth carry forward into young adulthood.  Those few brave young Americans who have volunteered to serve in our military over the past decade have gotten a rude awakening during training when they are taught, rightfully, that trying to choreograph a fair fight during wartime is simply stupid.  As a Marine infantry officer during the Vietnam War, I witnessed the tragic stupidity of overly restrictive ROE on many, many occasions.  I learned first-hand what can happen, and what did happen too many times, when the Commander in Chief, through my Chain of Command, ordered my Marines into battle after tying our hands behind our backs.  This happened many times during my 13-month tour in Vietnam.  I can remember vividly our frustration on one occasion in the Spring of 1968, when we caught a VC mortar squad red-handed, out in the open, but because but our Rules of Engagement, we let them get away. 

          Our infantry company’s mission was the security of several bridges along Highway 1 just south of Phu Bai.  My platoon was manning our defensive positions around Bridge 1 one afternoon when the sounds and concussion of incoming enemy mortars shattered the afternoon calm.  One of the other platoons in our infantry company had been patrolling west of us, and one of their observation posts surrounding their hidden daytime bivouac position reported that they had heard the first “bloops” of 60mm mortars being fired in our direction, and they had quickly spotted the VC.  At the same time, a Huey gunship was running a “canopy patrol” not far away, and the platoon commander switched to the Forward Air Control (FAC) frequency and requested a fire mission.  The Huey pilot acknowledged that they could clearly see the VC mortar squad out in the open, about a click from the safety of the jungle-covered mountains west of us.  We knew this was an enemy unit trying to kill us – there was no doubt.  The company commander and the platoon commander both requested a fire mission, but the Huey pilot reminded us that we were in a “restricted fire zone” and that he would need to get approval from his headquarters before he could unleash his rockets on these sitting ducks.  Approval finally came, about a half hour later, but the VC mortar squad had already escaped into the mountains.  The Huey unleashed its rockets in the general direction of the VC, but we all knew that this VC unit had survived and would be back to haunt us another day.

          Rules of engagement in Vietnam resulted in areas being organized around Zones:  Free Fire Zones (in which we could use all our firepower if we saw anything troubling, without receiving advance approval) and Restricted Fire Zones (in which we could not fire at anything, even if it was obviously an enemy unit, without prior approval).  The reasoning behind the Restricted Fire Zones was to keep civilian casualties in the nearby villages to a minimum, and to avoid our firing on “friendly units,” those from the South Vietnamese Army.  These rules were inviolable and we all knew that if we didn’t follow the rules there would be hell to pay.  This is one of many instances during my tour in Vietnam when we became our own worst enemy.

          The most atrocious instance of this stupidity occurred on 13 February 1968, when my platoon of U. S. Marines was ordered to frontally assault a vastly superior enemy force in the Citadel Fortress of Hué, with no supporting arms.  No air strikes, no artillery, no preparatory fires or heavy support of any kind.  These ROE were put into place because the politicians didn’t want to destroy any of the buildings in the sacred imperial capital of Hué, a historically important city that was at the heart of the Vietnamese soul. Our “sister” battalion, 2^nd Battalion, 5^th Marines, had been hampered by these same ROE during their earlier actions in South Hué, for the first six days of their battle, severely restricting their ability to destroy the NVA units that had captured that section of this historic city during the infamous Tet Offensive of 1968.  Despite the fact that the ROE had only resulted in the postponement of the destruction of homes and other buildings in South Hué and had caused untold numbers of unnecessary American casualties, despite the fact that the ROE didn’t work, one week later our Chain of Command and our Commander in Chief placed the same damnable ROE on our use of heavy support.  On that day, 13 February 1968, the 1^st Battalion, 5^th Marines, with my platoon on point, advanced toward an entrenched, determined enemy force with our hands tied neatly behind our backs.

          The first result of that terrible decision was that 60% of my Marines were either killed or severely wounded that day, after attempting three frontal assaults, and we made absolutely no progress against the enemy.  Those Rules of Engagement stayed in force for two more terrible days resulting in over 40% casualties in my battalion (a force of about 1,000 infantry Marines), with absolutely no progress against the enemy.

          We were an outstanding infantry battalion that had achieved victory after victory against this same enemy, the North Vietnamese Army; but in Hué during those first three very tragic days, all we accomplished was to get our own men killed.  I have imagined for over 40 years that our enemy was happily amazed during those three days, and laughing at us the whole time.  What they had never been able to accomplish, defeating us, was now being accomplished by our Commander in Chief, President Lyndon Johnson, and the American military’s Chain of Command.

          Fortunately for us, a famous Marine Corps General, Lieutenant General Victor H. “Brute” Krulak, heard about our situation and, risking his career and defying the politicians, lifted the ROE and allowed us to fight the way we had been trained.  Ten days later, we had accomplished our mission, the sound defeat of two NVA regiments, a force that turned out to be five times our size.  Unfortunately for the Vietnamese people, many of the ancient buildings in Hué were damaged or destroyed, but most of those Vietnamese civilians I saw during the aftermath, at least those who were still alive (the NVA rounded up and murdered over 3,000 South Vietnamese people in Hué while this battle was raging) were simply happy that the fighting was over and that the enemy had been soundly defeated.  Our victory, however, soured in our mouths because we all knew that many young Americans had died unnecessarily.  My own guilt as part of that Chain of Command haunts me to this day.  I knew it was wrong, my men knew it was wrong, everyone involved knew that this was just plain wrong, but we were given our orders and we had to obey.  Damaged real estate can be fixed; those outstanding young Marines I lost in Hué will never be recovered.  Now, today, in Afghanistan, history is repeating. 

          I believe the most important duty of the President of the United States, especially during a time of war, is his duty as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces.  America is at war right now, on many fronts.  Outstanding young Americans are dying tragically every day, in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Some of those deaths are the wages of war; some of them lie squarely at the feet of our military’s Chain of Command and the Commander in Chief, because the Rules of Engagement for our troops in harms’ way are totally out of balance with their ability to accomplish their mission.  The lives of brave young Americans who have volunteered to serve in our military are being put at risk, unnecessarily, so that the lives of Iraqi and Afghani civilians will not be.

          I call your attention to three Associated Press articles published over the past few months.  The first went nearly unnoticed by most Americans:

23 June 2009

Associated Press

Changes to the Rules of Engagement for Afghanistan

The U.S. commander in Afghanistan will soon order U.S. and NATO forces to break away from fights with militants hiding among villagers, an official said Monday, announcing one of the strongest measures yet to protect Afghan civilians.

The most contentious civilian casualty cases in recent years occurred during battles in Afghan villages when U.S. airstrikes aimed at militants also killed civilians. American commanders say such deaths hurt their mission because they turn average Afghans against the government and international forces …

Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who took command of international forces in Afghanistan this month, has said his measure of effectiveness will be the “number of Afghans shielded from violence” — not the number of militants killed.

McChrystal will issue orders within days saying troops may attack insurgents hiding in Afghan houses if U.S. or NATO forces are in imminent danger, said U.S. military spokesman Rear Adm. Greg Smith.

“But if there is a compound they’re taking fire from and they can remove themselves from the area safely, without any undue danger to the forces, then that’s the option they should take,” Smith said. “Because in these compounds we know there are often civilians kept captive by the Taliban.”

          Now, today, our young Marines fighting in Afghanistan have their hands tied behind their backs, and our enemies are surely laughing at us once again.  A few months ago, shortly after these new ROE were put into affect, a Marine infantry company patrolling in Southern Afghanistan was ambushed by a group of Afghani insurgents.  A large firefight took place and casualties were taken on both sides.  Getting the upper hand through their superior weapons and marksmanship, the Marines aggressively pursued their enemy who broke off from the fight and fled into a nearby village.  The company commander, mindful of the new ROE, surrounded the village but ordered a cease fire and had an interpreter talk to the insurgents over a loudspeaker.  The insurgents were told that they were trapped, and the interpreter asked them to release the women and children.  After a short time, several women and children exited the village and were released.  Once the ROE could be honored, and the “innocent” civilians were out of harm’s way, the Marines swept through the area and searched the village only to discover that the enemy had fled.  They had dressed up in the tent-like dresses of the Afghani women, covered their faces, and snuck out of Dodge.  Due to these ROE, this group of enemy fighters, just like that VC mortar squad, lived to fight another day.

          The second Associated Press article dramatically and tragically reports on the horror of this kind of limited war, and the horrendously negative impact of these ridiculous and overly restrictive Rules of Engagement:

Father of Dying Marine in AP Photo Calls for Changes in Afghanistan Rules of Engagement

By DAVID SHARP

Published: October 13, 2009 2:13 PM ET

NEW PORTLAND, Maine It was the last way John Bernard would have wanted his voice to gain prominence in the national debate over the war in Afghanistan.

The retired Marine had been writing to lawmakers for weeks complaining of the new rules of engagement he believed put U.S. troops at unacceptable risk in the insurgency-wracked country. He got little response.

Then Bernard’s only son, 21-year-old Lance Cpl. Joshua Bernard — a Marine, like his dad — was killed in an insurgent ambush in Afghanistan’s volatile Helmand province, the latest victim of a surge in U.S. combat deaths.

Three weeks later, Joshua became the face of that toll when The Associated Press published photos of the dying Marine against his father’s wishes and John Bernard was thrust into a national debate about the role of the press in wartime.

Suddenly, for all the worst reasons, John Bernard’s voice was being heard.

The loss of his son and the furor over the photo have given new resonance to his view that changes must be made in how the war is fought before President Barack Obama sends any more troops to battle the Taliban and al-Qaida.

“For better or for worse, I may be the face of this. That’s fine,” said Bernard, sitting on his porch as he drank coffee from a Marine Corps mug. “As soon as someone bigger can run with it, they can have the whole thing.”

Bernard’s criticism is aimed at new rules of engagement imposed by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the senior American commander in Afghanistan, five weeks before Joshua Bernard was killed. They limit the use of airstrikes and require troops to break off combat when civilians are present, even if it means letting the enemy escape. They also call for greater cooperation with the Afghan National Army.

Under those rules, John Bernard said, Marines and soldiers are being denied artillery and air support for fear of killing civilians, and the Taliban is using that to its tactical advantage. In a letter to his congressman and Maine’s U.S. senators, Bernard condemned “the insanity of the current situation and the suicidal position this administration has placed these warriors in.”

 …..

“We’ve abandoned them in this Catch-22 where we’re supposed to defend the population, but we can’t defend them because we can’t engage the enemy that is supposed to be the problem,” he said in an interview with the AP.

As a retired Marine, Bernard said he’s obligated to speak up. His son is now gone, but he said others are still at risk.

“We’ve got guys in harm’s way getting shot at and getting killed,” he said. “To me, it’s immoral that anybody in this country wouldn’t have that first and last on their minds.”

          I mourn today with Marine John Bernard and his family.  I cannot fathom his loss.  When I think about his loss, I remember those young Marines in Hué, those who obeyed my commands to rise up and assault the enemy, time after time, never once questioning the stupidity of their situation.  They had been trained to fight using supporting arms, but their Chain of Command and their Commander in Chief utterly failed them at a critical moment, and they went to their deaths.  Their names are different: Lance Corporal Ed Estes, PFC Kellynn Snow, PFC Charles Morgan, PFC Dennis Langrock and PFC Jerry Mounts all died that day, 13 February 1968.  Twenty-four others were severely wounded and medevacced – as a direct result of wrong-headed, overly restrictive Rules of Engagement.  Their wounds, their deaths, fall squarely at my feet, as part of their Chain of Command, and at the feet of their Commander in Chief.

          Young Joshua Bernard was trained, as a U. S. Marine, to fight the enemy using supporting arms.  He spent months and months in training, being constantly assured that he would receive the support he and his fellow Marines would need when the chips were down.  Although he knew he was in a dangerous occupation, I know he felt solace in the fact that the Marine on his left, and the Marine on his right, the supporting Marines behind him and above him would fight hard for him and his buddies.  He expected, with good reason, that his Chain of Command and his Commander in Chief would support him and in every way, with good intelligence and communications, with air power and artillery.  And, again tragically, his Chain of Command, his Commander in Chief, failed him at the critical moment.  Losses during a time of war are one thing; unnecessary losses are unacceptable.

          Another AP article reports on recent surveys taken by American troops serving in Afghanistan, headlined: “Army Says Morale Down Among Troops in Afghanistan.”  It cites numerous causes for declining morale, including “significantly more marital problems, increased exposure to combat, the wearing affect of long deployments,” and other factors.  Although the situation they are reporting on is tragic and should concern every American today, they have missed the essential point.

          The point they have missed (or blatantly failed to report) is that these great young Americans have come to realize that their Chain of Command, including their Commander in Chief, care less about them than they do about the “innocent” civilians.  Rules of Engagement have been established, and are being enforced, that put them at a severe disadvantage, and they know it.  We are told that this is necessary because we can’t afford to injure or kill innocent Afghani civilians.  The insanity of this statement is that we are unnecessarily risking the lives of American soldiers and Marines by trying to save Afghani lives.  This type of thing is simply politics, at its ugliest.  Those who have served in the cauldron of combat know that war is hell, and civilians are killed, no matter what steps are taken to avoid that tragic but inevitable consequence of war.

          I was somewhat heartened to read a recent article written by Senator James Webb, Democrat from Virginia.  Jim Webb is a highly decorated U. S. Marine Corp veteran of the Vietnam War.  His article, entitled “A Plan In Need Of Clarity” was written in response to President Obama’s speech at West Point, and his points are critically important to the success of our troops in Afghanistan.  Senator Webb is an outstanding writer, and his points are succinctly made with great clarity.  He states, “Our strategy is sound only if framed with clearly defined and attainable goals, an understandable end point and a regional perspective.”  When viewing the “big picture” in Afghanistan, these issues are certainly paramount to our ultimate success there.  But wars are not fought by people looking at the “big picture.”  They are not fought by Senators and Presidents and senior military leaders looking through TV screens and situational monitors.  They are fought on the ground, by our young people, by flesh and blood.  They are fought by those who have the most to lose – their lives.  Their fight is a desperate, daily struggle for success and survival.  Those who are fighting these wars every day deserve every advantage we can give them. 

          I have been told that I need to give President Obama a break – that he’s inexperienced and needs time to learn.  Although I do agree that he’s inexperienced in military matters, I will not give him a break.  Ignorance in warfare is never a valid excuse for slaughtering your own troops.  30,000 new troops in Afghanistan or 300,000 more troops?  It won’t matter very much if our Commander in Chief and the Chain of Command fail to give them all the tools and every advantage they need to accomplish their mission, and that the Rules of Engagement they are forced to live with, are reasonable and in balance with their ability to accomplish their mission.

          My charge to President Obama is that his highest priority is to give our troops every tool and complete latitude to protect themselves, to accomplish their mission, and to protect our country.  He must ensure, as our Commander in Chief, that the Rules of Engagement assigned to our military units are reasonable.  Our political goals for long term peace are important, but they are not more important than our sons and daughters who, on our behalf, face this vicious enemy, an enemy who has repeatedly defied every rule of warfare.  Our foreign partners will just have to understand that.

Nicholas Warr – 13 December 2009